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Introduction 
rfwentieth-century dictators exerted distinctive levels of political 
entralisation within their regimes : particularly among their min-
terial elites. As a result, institutions were banished, diminished or 
mpower ed according to rulers' concep tion of leadership and power 
harin g. In th at sense, the composition and role of these same institu-
' ons represent important pieces of a larger puzzle: that of decision-
aking under dictatorial regimes. 
This chapter seeks to ,contr ibut e towards th e stud y of the deci-
sion-making process in Portugal under Salazarism, focusing on the 
le of the counci l of ministers and exp lorin g the link s between the 
'ctator and his ministers. Although the New State und er Salazar's 
e lasted from 1932 until 1968, we focus excl usively on th e years of 
e regii:ne's institutionalisation . 
We discuss th e centra list strategy of the dictator, Antonio de 
liveira Salazar, based on a quantitative and qualitative study of his 
cliaries-detai led acco unt s of his routines , audiences, meetings and 
en telephone calls.' The quantitative analysis provides solid proof of 
e (ir)regularity of meetings of the co un cil of ministers and att ests 
'S,alazar kept a detai led diary right up until 1968. In it he kept a note of a significan t 
umber of the meetings h~ attended and telephone calls he received and the names 
of people who had appointments with him . Unfortunately, he did not keep a detailed 
ccount of the matt ers discussed during meetings. It is widely recognised that the first 
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to the (ir)relevance Salazar attributed to this particular institution, 
as previous studies have sustained (Cruz 1988; Pinto 2002). On the 
other hand, the qualitative analysis reveals important aspects of the 
relationship between the dictator and the individual ministers, which 
led us to rethink former general conclusions about the centralisation 
of power under Salazar's rule . Although the investigation covers only 
the period from April 1933 to May 1939, the dictator's diary facilitated 
a new look into the structures of power in Portugal during the first 
years of the New State ! 
The chapter begins by providing an overview of the existing 
studies on the general features of the New State, and its relevance 
for understanding political centralisation and the role of the coun-
cil of ministers after 1933. Based on the former, it focuses on the 
formal constitutional rules regulating the relationship between the 
prime minister and his cabinet, combining it with other contem-
porary sources. The core of the chapter then focuses on the actual 
practice of decision-making, using Salazar's personal notes as the 
major source for understanding collective and individual meetin~ 
with his ministers and inner-circle, including the frequency, politic 
context and the political agenda of these meetings. The conclusion 
corroborate former interpretations, while also suggesting importan 
nuances that are of significant relevance for understanding the per 
time his diary was used as a primary source was by Franco No gueira, who publishe 
a six-vo lum e biogr aphy of Salazar during th e 1970s and 1980s (Nogueira 1977-85), 
' The former date is that on which the first government was formed after the p 
mulgation of the 1933 constitution; the secon d is that on which the Spanish civil 
officially ended. The diaries for the period 16 August-JI December 1933 were no 
available. In respect of meetings of the council of ministers, this chronologic al lac 
was overcome by consulting press note s (AOS/CO/PC-8F, part I [1932-40]). Unfo 
tunately, it was not possible to overcome this absence in relation to Salazar's meetin 
with political leade rs and other indi viduals. In thi s sense, the analysis of the frequen 
and topics debat ed in the council of ministers includ es only April-December 19 
and January-May 1939. It is import ant to bear in mind conclu sion s do not i:1clu 
the beginning of the Second World War, which altered the frequen cy of council 
minist er meet ings. As for individual meetings, the reader should bear in mind 
analysis of 1933 is based on the months April-July. 
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sonalisation of power during the first years of Salazar as Portugal's 
de facto dictator. 
What do we know about political decision-making 
in Portugal under Salazar? 
Most of the existing research on political decision-making under 
dictatorial regimes focuses on the person of the dictator and the type 
of leadership expressed through discourses and practices. However, 
less· effort has been made to underst anding different levels of political 
centralisation and power distribution by focusing on other political 
institutions created by, or for, these regimes. With respect to Salazar-
ism this is even more striking: the first generic studies appeared in 
e late 1970s and 1980s and focused on the nature of the regime 
hile representing some of the first attempts to compare Salazar-
with other 'fascist regimes' (Lucena 1976; Schmitter 1975; Cabral 
1976; Cruz 1988). As a result, competing interpretations emerged, in-
. eating that either Portugal was governed by some sort of 'fascism 
'thout a movement' (Lucen a 1976) or that 'not all authoritarian-
s, were fascist' (Cruz 1988; see Pinto 1996). Linz 's seminal typology 
97S) would later influence some of the more political and compara-
e interpretations of tile New State, classifying the regime as 'au-
oritarian ' given certain of its features, such as its 'limited pluralism ' 
into 1995). However, Linz's typology did not establish a direct link 
etween regime type and the extent of the centralisation of decision-
king. Although scholars agreed from the beginning that Salazarism 
ul.d not be characterised as totalitarian, considerable work had yet 
be1done in order to understand the extent of power allocation by 
e 2oth-century dictators, including Salazar. 
From the 1970s on, no more than occasional references to the 
el of political centralisation in Portugal can be found. One of the 
liest references to the council of ministers provides a brief ac-
unt of its role, based on a few statements by Salazar and his minis-
(Cruz 1988). Cruz classified the council of ministers as a system 
vertical accountability based on a type of dictatorial 'rule of law'. 
azar listened to his ministers and collected the greatest amount 
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of inform ation poss ible about th e topic of discussion .. . but he kept 
th e final decision-ma king responsibili ty to him self' (Cru z 1988: 104). 
In a similar vein , one of th e m ost recen t co ntributi ons on th e minis-
terial elites of th e N ew State also conclud ed th at ' th e dictator effec-
tively elimin ated th e co un cil of mini sters, w hi ch was soon replaced 
by meetin gs with indi vidu al mi nisters. Cabin et m ee tin gs had become 
purely symb olic by th e mid -193os, only takin g place w hen th ere were 
fore ign and dom estic policy problems deserv in g to be shared with the 
nation, or when th ere were imp ort ant cabin et re-shuffles' (Alm eida, 
Pint o and Berm eo 2003). As we shall see, thi s was no t always th e case. 
It appears th e prevailin g notion about Salazar's governin g style has 
not changed mu ch over tim e. 'Whil e it wo uld cert ainly be an exag-
geration to claim Salazar created authorit arian rul e in Portu gal tou 
seul et de toutes p ieces, th e evid ence suggests he played a very person 
and imp erious role in both th e direction of policy after 1928 and in 
th e backin g of elites after 1932' (Schmitt er 1975: 52). 
As research cont inu es, we hope new studi es on oth er instances o 
Salazarist decision-m akin g will provi de new in sights and a mo re ho 
listic int erp retation of th e N ew State's decision- making pro cess. Ou 
contributi on will show ho w, overall, th e m aj or ity of auth ors men 
tioned above we re able to grasp th e general idea about th e role o 
th e coun cil of mini sters and th e distributi on of powers und er Salazar 
but imp or tant nuances need to be clarifi ed. Th e first step is to inqui 
w hether rul es are co nsistent with discour se and practice. 
T he co unc il of min isters: 
between fo rma l rules, disco urse and practice 
Salazar became head of gove rn me nt in Jul y 1932, yet his convio 
tion about th e ine fficiency of th e coun cil of mini sters wo uld onl 
beco me practice in 1933, shortly before th e new con stituti on h 
been enacted . In fact, durin g 1932, th e press still referred to 'or 
nary' meetin gs of th e co un cil of mini sters- held every Frid ay-
' extraordin ary' m eetin gs th at we re held under special circum stanc 
(Diario de Not{C,:as, Janu ary and Septemb er 1932). H ence, th e esta 
lished routin e th at had characterised th e milit ary dictator ship sin 
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1926 wo uld continu e for a few mon th s after Salazar's appointment, 
until th e coun cil of min isters was transforme d int o an 'ex trao rdin ary' 
meeting of th e w hole cabin et. 
If we con sider Salazar's earlier statem ent s, we can ventur e that 
his centrali sing tend ency probably did not come as a surpr ise to th e 
contemporary politi cal elite. Hi s 'propagan distic' interviews w ith 
Antonio Ferro constit ute some of th e earliest evidence of his conv ic-
tions about political decision-m akin g. In an in terview in early D e-
cember 1932, Salazar began by exposing his ant i-pa rliam ent ary views 
while also recog nising th e advan tages of holding mee tin gs of th e 
council of ministers: 
Even whi le acknow ledging its necessity, parliament scares me so much that 
I am afraid of what will come out of it. C learly there are always three months 
dur ing which there can be good suggestions; but there are usually many 
speeches, many words. As a small parliament-which, as in the present case 
is useful and prod uctive, the council of ministers is sufficient for me. (Ferro 
2003: 95) 
Th en , with the enactm ent of th e co nstituti on , Salazar transfor me d 
's convictions int o for mal rul es, namely throu gh w hat was not said 
bout th e co un cil of minj.sters. T he co nstituti on established a 'pres i-
ential' reg im e centred on th e prim e mini ster : Salazar (C ru z 1988). 
he coun cil of ministers became nothin g m ore than a mee ting of 
ministers . . . presided over by eith er th e president of th e coun cil or 
e president of th e republi c' (Cae tano 196): 539).T he only constitu-
'onal role attribut ed to it was to nomi nate colonial governo rs, whic h 
y be inter preted as an expression of po litical cen tralisation, since 
e task of app ointing co lonial governors should, in princip le, belong 
the mini ster for th e colonies (1933 co nstituti on , ar ticle 108). In ef-
ct, there was no specific section in th e constituti on dedicated to th e 
uncil of mini sters, and th erefore no reference was m ade to a regu lar 
embly of th e cabin et. 
Th e Portu guese cons tituti on of 1933 put an en d to th e parliam en-
,primus inter pares, type of pri me minister, puttin g an end to collec-
e mini sterial respo nsibili ty and total mini sterial cr ises (Gorn;:alves 
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1960: 29). The prime minister (president of the council of ministers) 
became the real holder of effective power (Caetano 1963: 529), with 
overall responsibility for the direction and supervision of general pol-
icy. This aspect is noteworthy because it represented a formal and in-
stitutionalised break with the practices of the military dictatorship. 
While the constitution denied the council of ministers any effec-
tive power, ordinar y law granted it political and administrative ftmc-
tions, the importance of which increased over time . Thus, for example, 
the council of ministers was granted authority over the concession of 
pensions for important services (1929), for the approval of extra-or-
dinary credits (1935), the dismissal, retiral or pen sioning off of those 
civil servants who opposed the constitution's principles (1935) and for 
authorising the accumulation of public offices (1935). All of this sug-
gests that these attributions were an attempt to prevent some matters 
from being left up to ministers. In fact, Salazar, through some sort of 
tacit delegation, ended up 'dispaching all processes as if they had been 
approved by the Council, even those the resolution of which had po-
litical value and public impact ' (Caetano 197T 187). 
Our hypothesis is that by establishing little more than the presi-
dent's conditions for presiding over the council of ministers, Sala 
zar's concern was not only with constitutionally defining his rela,tio 
with the cabinet, but also with the president of the republic, Osc 
Carmona. In fact, the constitution states that the council of ministers 
should meet whenever the prime minister or the president judge 
it to be necessary (Constitution of the Portuguese Republic 1933 
article no). However, the president 's 'need' was also constitutional! 
predet ermined. 3 It can be said that by constitutionally enforcing cab~ 
net meetings to deal with such issues, Salazar guaranteed these dec1 
, The president of the republi c pre sided over the coun cil . of ministers under th 
following circum stances: to address the national assembly (articl e _81, section 2), nam 
the date of a general or supplement ary elect ion (article 81, section 3); bestow co. 
stitu ent authority in specific matt ers to the national assembly (articl e 81, section 4, 
the term s of article 134); convo ke extraordinary meetings of the national assembly 
to adjourn it (article 81, section 5); to dissolve the national assembly (article 81, se 
6); or to pardon or commute sentences (article 81, section 8). 
POLITI CAL DECISION - MAKIN G IN THE PORTUGUESE N EW STATE 143 
sions remained und er his co ntrol. In addition to formal co nsultation s 
with the co un cil of state (in the case of the attribution of constitu ent 
powers, extraordinary meetings, po stpon ement s and dissolutions), th e 
president was obliged to call a meeting of the council of ministers in 
all cases of conflict with the assembly. However, the se meetings were 
not entirely autonomous and nor were th ey limit ed to liaison with 
the prime minist er: they involved the entire cabinet. R esolution of 
institutional crises with the assembly was achieved throu gh implicit 
cooperation between the president and the government. 
All thi s contribut ed to the prime minister becoming pre-e min ent: 
it was the head of th e exec utive branch, and not th e govern m ent or 
the mini sters, who answe red to the pre sident. Mini sterial responsibil-
ity was exercised jointly with th e prime minister , who coordinated 
and directed their activities. The appointment and replacement of 
ministers and under -sec retaries was made by the president, but only 
on the advice of th e prime minister, whose signatur e was required on 
all decrees. These facts indicate the tendenc y 'to transform the pre si-
dency into the nucl eus of admini strative services and bodies that, by 
their natur e or through practical convenience, must be co mmon to 
the entire government or be separated from the existing ministers' 
(Caetano 2005: 278), or a kind of secretariat or research office within 
the pre sidency of th e co uncil is assembled a set of important adrnin-
. trative services of information, study, research and knowledge that 
akes of them a true ministry, in which are dealt th e common qu es-
' ons of government and the general problem s of policy : the prime 
minister may delegate to his minist er ial assistants som e of his man-
gement and coordinating authority as head of the presidency of the 
council (Cae tano 1963: 531). 
Salazar's way of reducing the council of minister's decision-making 
le was by ensuring it did not have to approve decree- laws, even 
hen they had been signed by every minister (D ecree- law 22470, 
I April 1933). Thu s, when the constitution says thi s or that matter 
• the responsibility of the government, it doe s not mean it need s to 
e exercised jointly by th e prime minister and his ministers: it means 
ach minister, exercising the administrative duties of the department 
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und er his contro l, possesses the authority constitutiona lly conferred 
on the government (Caetano r963: 538). 
T his und erstanding of the role of the counci l of ministers was 
elaborated by M arcelo Caetano, who was presiden t of the exec utive 
commission of the single party, the N ational Union (UN-Uniao 
Nacional), in r947, head of the corporatist chamber from r949-55, 
colon ial minister from 1944-7 and Salazar's successor from 1968 until 
the regime's overthrow on 25 April r974. 
Caetano, who was one of the regime's major ideologists, and who 
had the personal experience of relating with Salazar as a minister in 
the r94os, made some recommendations when analysing the role of 
the council of ministers, which supports the idea that the centrali-
sation of power, more th an ideology, was a personal conviction of 
Salazar's: 'whenever th e material involves a declaration oflaw, it is ad-
visable that it be approved by the coun cil of ministers, notwithst and-
ing the fact it will later be examined by the com pete nt legislativ 
services of the presidency of the coun cil and, preferably, reviewed b 
the corpora tist chamber'. That was not how Salazar worked, as Ca~ 
etano himself would find out: 'as th e signa tur e of each minister was 
pledged individually' (Cae tano 1963: 533-4). It was even the case tha 
decree-laws were published in the Diario do Governo with the signa 
ture of ministers who had not actually signed them (Caetano 197 
186-7). Only for a short period during the r95os did he respond t 
Caetano's request by creating bi-monthly meetings; how ever, thes 
did not endure . 
Salazar's beliefs wou ld only become stronger over time, particu 
lady after the end of the Second World War and the reshaping of th 
Europ ean political map. Following a ministerial reshuffie in Au 
1940, Salazar highlighted the role of strong leaders hip . He believe 
the 'poor yield of [democratic] systems' was due mainly to what h 
believed was a waste of time. It is clear that he viewe d his ministers 
a gro up of experts with whom the leader shou ld cons ult , rathe r t 
as a government. 'Except for those meetings that are held to disc 
either essential policy matters or to provide general guidance, 
tematic work in cabinet must be of poor value and low quality 
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addition to the time the ministers lose.' Thus, in Salazar's opinion , 
compared to other political systems and regimes, the governance of 
the New State possessed clear advantages (Salazar 1943: 271-2) . 
The best method is without doubt that which we have used for years : that 
of the head of government working with the minister or ministers whose 
portfolios are directly affected by the problem , or of small comm itt ees that 
are cons tituted and with legal attributes to deal with sets of problems, as in 
the cases of the corpo rative counc il and the coun cil of ministers for external 
co mmer ce. (Salazar 1943: 272) 
The fact he had neither a private secretary who kept record s, nor 
even a register of the council of mini sters ' delib erations, says some-
thing about Salazar's decision-making authority . He him self stated : 
It is strange that the council of ministers does not have, and I don't know if 
it ever had , a secretaria t or that its deliberations are recorded in writing. The 
only true record is of the resolu tions that are made in the dispatches that 
emanate from the counc il. (Salazar 1951: 442) 
The weak deliberative au th ority of the council of ministers was 
ped by the organisation of the services that supported them . 
1933 th e legislation referred only to the functions of a presidency 
f the council secretariat that consisted only ofrecording decree-laws 
ntaining genera l dispositions. Nevertheless, these functions were 
aranteed by th e secre tary general to th e ministry of finances, which 
also headed by Salazar. It was only in 1938 that the pre sidency of 
e council secretariat, the head of government's bureaucratic adrnin- ' 
tive body, was created (Gonyalves r960: 47). It's duties included 
cording the legislative diplomas, archiving th e original documents 
d associated files, recording the laws and decr ees to be published in 
e Diario do Governo, filing the originals of th e diplomas mentioned 
ove, ensuring that all files relating to procedures that must be sub-
"tted to the prim e minister or the council of ministers for their 
reciation regardless of th e ministry affected, and taking care of all 
the rest of th e prime minister's filing and recording. From 1932 
there also existed a separate prim e minister's office, althou gh it had 
no legal status. N othin g was said regarding th e role of this bod y with 
respect to int er-ministerial coor din ation , which did not begin until 
1949 (Salazar 1951: 441-2). 
The above comme nt s are consis tent with our findings follow-
ing our ana lysis of Salazar's diaries, which leads us to concl ude 
th ere we re three main types of meetings b etween Salazar, hi s min-
isters and the inn er-c ircl e: a) excep tiona l meetings of th e co un cil 
of mini sters th at were held only on specifi c occasions; b) one- to-
one meetings between Salazar an d a mini ster to solve problems 
directly associated w ith a specific portfolio and policy area; and 
c) 'spec ialist co un cils'. We w ill exp lore the main charac ter istics of 
each separa tely. 
Meetings of the council of ministers 
During his early years as prime minister (1933-9), Salazar met his 
coun cil of ministers on 94 days, representing an average of 15 meet-
ings per year. Ho wever, th e average is an insufficien t instrument for 
thi s analysis, as the concentrati on of m eeting s during specific periods 
of tim e is one of the inter estin g features. In other wor ds, the non-
-systema tic gather ing of th e cabinet is one of the most imp or tant 
points to be m ade, and one th at deserves further elaboration. Sec-
on dly, what makes the analysis interesting is to und erstan d how these 
m eeting s were distributed over tim e, and what Salazar in practice 
co nsidered 'essential policy matters and general guid ance' durin g the. 
regime's early years. 
Starting with the tim eline distribution , what becomes clear · 
th e lack of regularity. In 1935 th ere were thr ee meetings every two 
m on ths, while durin g th e years until 1938 the cabin et met once eac 
month, after which it averaged thr ee m eetin gs every four mont 
(Figure 6. 1). 
With respec t to th e topi cs on the agen da, our observa tions sho 
that th e m ain subj ects discussed at the meetings ranged from cur 
rent affairs (52 per cent) to debate over political reform (13 pe 
cen t), soc ial an d politi cal dom estic cr ises (24 per cent) and inter 
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Figure 6.1 
N um ber of meeti ngs of the co unci l of ministers (1933 - 9) 
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Source : I CS database on Salazar (2009) . 
nation al politics ( II per cent). If we put together the three 'excep-
. onal' topics (po liti cal reform , soc ial and politi cal crises and in-
ternation al politi cs-t he latter includin g only issues relating to the 
olitical co nt ext and co nflicts in inter-war Europe), th e interpreta-
· on becomes slightly different. On this first attempt to evaluate the 
council of mini sters ' agenda during this period, we can tentatively 
conclud e that only 52 per cen t of the meetings were dedicated to 
urre nt affairs , that is, approx im ately half of th e times Salazar decid-
ed to gather th e whole cabin et somet hin g 'exceptional' was on the 
ble. This suggests Salazar met his cabine t not so much to hand le 
essent ial policy matters', but on ur gent matters of' genera l guid -
ce'. What we still do not know is whe th er there was any real 
eliberation , or if the meetings were merely to provide a formal 
ndors eme nt of Salazar's decision s. 
Table 6.1 
Topics discussed at the council of ministers by category (%) 
Topics 
Current Political reform and Domestic social International 
affairs* institutionalisation and political crises politics 
% 52.0 13.0 24.0 11.0 
• Thi s category includes foreign affairs as both a governm ental and policy area. It is 
distinct from what is classified as 'international politics' , which includes con-
textual concerns typical of the inter-w ar period. 
Source:AOS/ JANTT (Lisbon). Categori es were created according to the informa-
tion provided by Salazar in his diary. Wh en the information was insufficien 
oth er sources were used. 
The average of monthly meetings in 1933, after Salazar was ap 
pointed head of governmen t for the second time, is th e highest o 
this initial period of the N ew State . From the promulgation of th 
constitution until the end of 1933, Salazar met his council of ministe 
on average twice a month. This was probably in part due to a 'lega 
of the military dictatorship (his predecessor had a regular Friday a 
pointment with the entire cabinet), but primarily it exp resses Salazar 
decision to get the approva l of the whole cabinet on the several stag 
of the regime's institutionalisation. On the table were the corpo ra 
ist organisation of the state, the administra tive code and th e electo 
rules. Current issues relating to the co loni es and the agric ultural c 
real regime were also discussed. 
In 1934 the corporatist organisation was still being debated, b 
what is most striking about the meetings of the council of ministe 
in this year-which were significantly less frequent than in previo 
or succeeding years-was Salazar's decision to involve his cabin 
in the management of all dom estic socia l and political crises. 
would a strong dictator, a non-charismatic leader, a face-to-face 
duced-inner-circle ruler, decide to gather his ministers to make 
cisions on what to do with the opposition to the regime? Begin · 
with the major trade union strike against the corporat ist orga1 · 
tion and in support of free labour movements (18 January 19 
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and ending with the threat represented by Rolao Preto's blue shirt 
movement (Pinto 2000) , Salazar brought them all to the council of 
ministers. After the latter episode, the cabinet appeared to be some 
sort of in strument to legitimise the powers of the dictator. One day 
after Preto confronted Salazar by directly addressing him in a protest 
letter (follow in g which he and his deputy, Alberto Monsaraz, wer e 
exiled to Spain), the cabinet met to show its support for Salazar. 
In 1935, opposition to the regime , which included the working 
class movement, segments of the Integralists and the Freemasons, was 
again a major concern for Salazar, whose diary indicates that actu-
al measures were discussed wi th his ministers , including the idea of 
purging the public admin istration and forcing the most prominent 
leaders into exi le. This was confirmed by the decree that gave th e 
ouncil of ministers authority to dismiss government emp loyees who 
oppo sed the New State, a responsibility that Salazar appears to have 
ted to share with his ministers . 
The international situation became of pressing concern to Sala-
in 1936. One of the most interesting observations is perhaps the 
hang e of topics from 1936 to 1937. In May 1936 Salazar dismissed 
e minister of war and took over the portfolio himself. In Novem-
er he also took over the ,ministry of foreign affairs. This seems to 
ve had an impact on the already reduced role of the council of 
'nisters. By 1937, concerns over exist in g and potential conflicts 
ere no longer of centra l importance to the counci l of ministers, 
pit e the outcome of the Spanish civil war remaining un certain 
d the remilitarisation of the Rhineland. This is even more striking 
hen we note that on 19 February 1937, Salazar met some tru sted 
lleagues-the minister of the interior, Mario Pais de Sousa, the 
'nister of justice, Rodrigues Junior, and the secretary-genera l of 
e foreign ministry, Teixeira de Sampaio - to discuss (without the 
olvement of th e co un cil of ministers) the introduction of a regu-
·an to prohibit Portuguese citizens from becoming involved in 
civil war in Spain. 
From 193 8 until the end of the period being studied, international 
'ties rema ined off the political agenda, despite the ongoing nature 
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of the civil war in Spain and th e steady n1arch of Europe to war. New 
matters relating to the regime 's opposition were dealt with, as were 
several minor issues, such as ship tran sport for th e co lonie s and the 
preparations for th e 1940 world exhibition in Lisbon. 
The analysis of th e frequen cy of mee tings and th e council of min-
isters' agend a indi cates both th e un willingn ess of Salazar to gather 
th e whole cabin et on a regul ar basis, and his decision to deprive it 
of decision-makin g power: parti cularly in respect to current political 
affairs. As suggested by Salazar's own declaration s, and in order to ac-
curately exam in e th e ex tent of his politi cal cen tralisation , th e qu es-
tion rema ins whether the Portu guese dictator formed smaller and 
restricted councils of ministers , or held individu al meetings at which 
he discussed th e matters of each portfolio in a mor e efficient and de-
liberate mann er. 
Meetings between the prime minister and his ministers 
The period April 1933-May 1939 provides eleme nt s for rethink-
ing both th e distribution of power during th e regime's institution-
alisation and the importance Salazar attributed to various ministe-
ri al portfolios. Mor e precisely , we believe th at th e frequen cy with 
which Salazar m et hi s mini sters individu ally partly explains both 
how mu ch he sought to control th e issue s and the degree of au-
ton omy granted to the minist er. Followin g th e analysis of individual 
me etings betw een Salazar and his minister s-o nc e again based on 
his personal notes-o ur researc h show s it is po ssible to group the 
ministries as follows: (1) th e most important : int erior ; (2) th e int er-
mediate: commerce and indu stry, public works and foreign affairs 
(until Salazar assum ed per sonal co ntrol ); (3) oflittle import ance: ag-
ricultur e, navy and co lonies; and (4) of residual importanc e: ju stice, 
war and education (Table 6.2). 
The most imp ortant portfolio was clearly th at of the int erior nun-
istry, although only from 1936, w hen M ario Pais de Sou sa took con 
trol of th e office. Salazar reshuffled this mini stry thr ee time s between 
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1933 and 1936,4 and durin g those initial three years th e frequency of 
meetings w ith each minister suggests th at not every portfolio had 
the sam e import ance. Salazar m et with th e first interio r minist ers ju st 
as mu ch as he did with the minist ers of ju stice, war and education . 
Thi s first case shows th at th e difficulty in analysing th e import ance 
of portfolios vis-a-v is minister s is du e to the fact that th e frequency 
of meetings with ministers did not always reflect the exte nt of their 
ability to act aut onomo usly or th e exte nt of th eir involvement in th e 
decision-makin g process. Althou gh it is und eniable that the int erior 
nuni stry was a highly important portfolio in th e N ew State , th e indi-
vidual w ho held the po sition was, in th is case, imp ortant. 5 
Comme rce and industry was th e next mo st imp or tant portfolio in 
terms of th e regularity of its meetings with Salazar. 6 Ind eed, until th e 
outbr eak of the Spanish civil war in 1936, this was apparently th e most 
import ant mini stry in term s of th e co nt act tim e th e minister had with 
Salazar. Ho wever, it is curi ous to note the minister w ho held thi s of-
fice until 1936 was not only an imp or tant figure in th e initial con-
struction of th e corpo ratist organisation (whi ch was a major feature 
of Salazar's regim e), he was also th e person to whom Salazar turn ed 
'for co unsel over matters related to Spain and for the establishm ent 
oflink s with Franco, using his personal conn ec tions w ith Gil Robl es' 
(Alexandr e 2000: 207). 
N ext in the order of import ance cam e th e mini stry of public 
work s and communications. Except for th e period 1936-8, thi s min-
istry was headed by Duarte Pacheco, a man who was close to Salazar 
and who was gran ted a large degree of aut onomy; however, in 1938, 
'The first was Albin o dos Reis (1933), who was app ointed during the militar y 
dictatorship, the second was Gomes Pereira (1933-4) and the third was Linhares de 
Lima (1934-6). 
i It wou ld seem Caetano's contention that there was a gro up of portfo lios with 
easier personal access to the head of government, whi le there were o thers that were 
restricted to brief meetings , telephon e conve rsation s and written corres ponden ce, 
ooes not seem to be sustainable (Caetano 1977). 
6 During the period being studied, this ministry was heade d by Sebastiao Garcia 
arnirez (1933-6),Teotonio Pere ira (1936-7) and Costa Leite (1937-40) . 
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Table 6.2 
Meetings with ministers before, during and after holding office 
Ministers Total 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 Portfolio 
Albino dos Reis 
Gomes Pereira 
Linhares de Lima 
Pais de Sousa 
Manuel Rodrigues 
14 
25 
76 
22 
2 
2 
4 
9 
21 12 
1 
184 
9 
252 
20 
264 
10 
62 
0 
Int erior 
Int erior 
Interior 
Interior 
Luis Alberto de Oliveira 
Passos e Sousa 30 ~ 7 13 
25 
10 
5 
23 
Ju stice 
War 
War 
Mesquita Guimaraes 
Ortins de Bettencourt 
Caeiro da Mata 
Mesquit a Guimaraes 
Armindo Monteiro 
71 
79 
69 
4 
131 
Joaquim Silva Abranche s 23 
Bossa 19 
Francisco (Vieira) Machado 7 6 
Cordeiro Ramo s 2 
Sousa Pinto 30 
7 
11 
10 
5 
22 
23 
33 
22 46 
0 
13 
27 25 4 
Navy 
N avy 
Foreign 
Foreign 
50 er /; 3 './ 0 • Foreign / Colonies 
16 
4 
1 
14 
I'_:·: _ - -- . _ 0 i 
4 6 2 
Public works 
Colonies 
Colonies 
Edu cation 
Education 
Education 
Education 
Edu cation 
63 69 38 .)1:g/ .> ' 12):'. >f 
Manuel Rodrigues 
Eusebio Tamagnini 
Carneiro Pacheco 
Garcia Ramirez 
Teot6nio Pereira 
Costa Leite 
Queim ado de Sousa 
Neves Duque 
26 
56 
258 
206 
183 
14 
156 
: '32_, -:_ 19, 47 42 \,h 
I,--,-~-+-, - - \ .,.. ' .,. I .,.. '-----------,----,f-'-'-~ "--'-'-~_,_; ___, 
Commerce and industry 
Commerce and indu stry 
Commerce and indu stry 
Agri culture 
1771 Prior to 
~ holding office n As under-LJ secretary 
Source. ;cs t!mabmnrrr &llITZar (2009). 
D As mini ster 
67 
-··•·§ ;;•·:·--
22 40 
n After holding 
LJ office 
12 
14 Agriculture 
r'l Interim for more than 
LJ one month 
z 
5l 
m 
"O 
0 
El 
C 
Cl 
C 
m 
V, 
m 
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the number of meetings with the minister of public works increased 
to such an extent that they supp lanted those with the minister for 
commerce and industry, which can be exp lained by the preparations 
for the forthcoming commemorat ion celebrations (for the foundation 
of Portugal in u40 and the restoration of independence in 1640). 
Curious ly, and compared to other dictatorships, the ministry of 
foreign affairs-of which Salazar took contro l in 1936-was treated 
with less importance during the first three years. The personal profiles 
of the holders of these offices perhaps explain this difference (Caeiro 
da Mata [1933-5] and Arminda Monteiro [1935-6]). It seems Salazar 
acted as the holder of this portfolio from the outset, although he did 
not officially assume responsibility until November 1936. 
The departments of justice , agri cultur e, navy and coloni es were 
rooted at a regularly low level throughout this period. Once again, 
this analysis considers whe th er the lack of meeting s between Salazar 
and other senior government officials may have a linear and immedi-
ate significance: the prime mini ster' s devaluation of certain portfolios. 
In this case, it is important to review the act ivities of the minister o 
ju stice, Manuel Rodrigues Junior, who was th e lon gest serv ing rnin 
ister of this period ( 1932-40). As far as can be ascertained, Rodrigue 
Junior had substantial decision - making powers. It was he who pro 
ceeded with important legal reforms, such as the reorganisation o 
the Superior Counci l of th e Justiciary (CSJ-Conselho Sup er ior Ju 
diciario) in 1933, who elaborated the electora l law in 1934 and prom 
ulgated the decree outlining sanctions for serving with an enemy · 
1935. The few meetings he had with Salazar were co ncerned mainl 
with the dom estic political situation. 
In thi s way it is possible to conclude that a minister 's profile 
the determining factor in relation to the number of meetings th 
were able to have with the prime minister. This can be supporte 
through an analysis of the numb er of meetings Salazar held with 
mini sters, both before and after they held office. Those who we 
closest to Salazar were those who met him more often . Garcia Rami 
rez, Duarte Pacheco and Teot6nio Pereira continued to be heard afte 
they had left office. Another main criterion that facilitated face-t 
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face meetings with Salazar was technical competence. Falling into this 
category were the ministers of public works and of commerce, with 
both holding office longer than any ot her. In both cases, it is worth 
highlighting th e fact that Salazar did not end th e face-to-face meet -
ings and conversations after their 1ninisterial rep lacement. With the 
former , all of the meetings were on the matter of public works, and 
only rarely were they related to Lisbon municipal co un cil (of which 
Pacheco was mayor 1936-8). With the latter, meetings between the 
two were frequent even before 1932. 
The same can also be said of Pedro Teot6nio Pereira who, as an 
under-secretary of state, had more meetings with Salazar than the 
minister of justice , Manuel Rodrigues. Thus, the claim made by Te-
ot6nio Pereira as he recalled his time as und er-secretary of state for 
corpor atio ns, that 'the prime minister adopted a system of working 
individually with each minister that meant he had very littl e free 
time in w hich to organise his weekly schedule', is unlik ely to be true 
(Pereira 1972: 109). 
Finally, we note Salazar held more meetings with the director-
general of publi c accounts, Antonio Jos e Malheiro , than he did with 
the under-s ecretary of state for finances. The same was true of the 
secretary-general of thefll.inistry of fore ign affairs, who had almo st as 
many meetings with the prime minister as th e portfolio's ministers . 
As for the 'mini-council of ministers', it is true Salazar met with 
two or three ministers at a tim e to discuss matters that could int er-
est several ministries. Some of the most important examp les include: 
meetings wit h the ministers of foreign affairs and of commerce (to-
gether with the general secre tary of foreign affairs) to discuss corn- I 
mercial agreements with France and the Netherlands (1934) and with 
Spain (1936); meetings with the ministers of agricult ure and of com-
merce, both in 1934 and 1935, to discuss specific decree -laws related 
to these ministries; meetings with the ministers of justice and of the 
interior (often with the head of the political police) to discuss th e 
olitical crises and measures to deal with political prisoners. 
This overview of Salazar's meetings with ministers demonstrates 
that in many cases he preferred individual and small-gro up meetings 
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corpor ation s, occ upi ed by Teo tonio Pereira (1933-6), and finances 
and war-two of Salazar's own portfolios. Cos ta Leite occupied the 
former from 1934-7, while Sant os Cos ta served in the latter between 
1936 and 1944. It is worth notin g th at the individual often made a 
difference. 
Unsurprising ly, neither the national assembly nor th e corpo rat-
ist chamber seems to have been import an t to Salazar. This assertion 
is based on th e number of tim es he m et th eir respective presidents. 
As prime mini ster, he met th e national assembly pr esident, Jo se Al-
berto dos Rei s, only 31 times between April 1933 and May 1939, and 
met th e corporatist chamber president Eduardo M arques ten times 
over a similar period . 
Howe ver, Antonio Ferro, director of th e N ational Prop aganda 
Secretariat (SPN - Secretariado de Prop agand a N acional) , was con-
stan tly at th e prim e mini ster 's side. It is worth no ting th at th ere was 
no ministr y of prop agand a, and nor was ther e any under-s ecre tariat. 
The numb er of tim es Salazar held meetings with the leaders of the 
UN and the Portuguese Youth (MP - Mocid ade Portuguesa) is not 
mentioned.Th e only exce ption to thi s was Costa Leite who, as well as 
being presid ent of the Portuguese Legion's (LP-Leg iao Portu guesa) 
central committ ee from 1936-44 , was also und er-secre tary of state and 
th en minister of finance. 
Table 6.3 highlights one aspect of our analysis that is difficult to 
measure: the exercise of informal pow er by tho se who surrounded 
Salazar. In thi s group, we includ e people who did not hold any par-
ticular politi cal office, but who often spent informal tim e with Sala-
zar, in many cases gossiping about politics. The most noteworthy of 
the se were Bissaia Barreto, th e Lacerda family, M ario Pais de Sous'a 
and Jo se Antonio Marques. Th e common factor among them is their 
backgro und: they all graduat ed from th e Univ ersity of Co imbr a, Sala-
zar's alma mater and the univer sity at which he taught. 
Of the se, th e name ofBissaia Barreto is signifi cant. Barreto was a 
deputy in the cons titu en t republi can assembly of 1911 when he rep-
resented the Evolutionist Party . He was a freemason and a member 
of the Coimbra Carbonaria, and joined th e UN when it was formed 
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in 1930, beco min g a member of its centr al comrniSS1on on 5 Jul y 
1932. H e was also appointed member of the corporatis t chamber in 
1961. Hi s republican orig in s led many to believe he represented 'the 
New State's m ain republi can guarant ee'. Salazar lun ched with Bar-
reto no fewer th an 186 tim es during the period being studi ed , and 
was recorded as being in the prime minister's compa ny no fewer 
than 195 times. 
We should also note the case of Jero nimo Lacerda, a lectur er in th e 
medicin e faculty. H e founded the Caram ulo sanatorium and headed 
the UN 's distri ct commiss ion in Tondela. In total, members 9f the 
Lacerda family met Salazar informally 89 times between April 1933 
and May 1939. 
Salazar's sister's brother-in-law, M ario Pais de Sousa, had 76 infor -
mal m eetin gs with th e prime mini ster. Pais de Sou sa was a law gradu -
ate and, as a stud ent, a member of th e C hri stian Democracy Aca-
demic Centre (CADC-Ce ntro Academico de Democracia Crista) 
later j oinin g the right-wing Liberal R ep ubli can Uni on (ULR -
Uni ao Liberal Republicana). He had support ed the 28 M ay co up in 
1926, and served as int erior mini ster during th e co nsequ ent milit ary 
dictators hip. H e wen t on to becom e a leader of the UN and a depu ty 
in the national assembly. !-Jnder Salazar he served as interior minister 
from 18 January 1936 to 6 Sept em ber 1944. 
Finally, there was Jose Antonio M arques. M arques, w ho was from 
Santa Com ba Dao, had aband one d the priesthood before graduat -
ing in law from th e Univ ersity of Co imbra -w here he was one of 
Salazar's con tempo raries- in 1911. He had serve d as mayor of Santa 
Comba Dao, under - director at th e office of th e Supreme Co urt of 
Justice (STJ-Supr emo Tribun al de Ju sti<;:a) and as a deputy in th e 1 
national assembly (Brochado 198T 138-9) . Salazar met M arques in-
form ally 38 tim es to have dinn er and take a walk; however, if we are 
to calculate th e numb er of tim es th ese men were together, we reach 
a figure of 293 .9 
9 Salazar was also close to other people , althoug h he saw them a great deal less 
often : Serras e Silva (27 tim es); Sebastiao Garcia R amir ez (18); Teixeira de Sampa io 
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These figures place in doubt the idea that dominant interests 
sought to influence Salazar and his political decisions informally. It is 
also important to highlight the names that one would expect to ap-
pear frequently, based on existing literature and research about Sala-
zar: Cardinal Cerejeira, Diniz da Fonseca and Mario de Figueiredo 
but who, according to his diary, had very few meetings with Salazar. 
This is even more surprising if we bear in mind they were all personal 
friends of Salazar from the CADC. 
Conclusion 
During the initial period of Salazar's rule the analysis shows that, 
with respect to the council of ministers, there was no governnil':nt 
routine and neither was there any regularity of meetings. It would ap-
pear Salazar's cabinet was little more than a crisis management corn-
mi ttee in which meetings were determined by the situation. 
The records of Salazar's meetings with the ministerial elite support 
the notion he was a 'strong dictator', not because he was a charis-
matic leader, but due to his 'extensive centralisation of decision-mak-
ing' (Pinto 2002: 413). However, although the cabinet was in practice 
a very weak institution in terms of decision-making power, Salazar 
did have his 'personal counsellors'-some of whom were appointed 
ministers at a certain moment-which created a degree of confusion 
between public office and personal trust that is not always easy to 
disentangle. 
Everything seems to suggest that-with the exception of the i'n 
terior ministry-meetings had more to do with general policy than 
with matters for which the ministries were responsible. Thus, in port-
folios such as the ministry of justice, meetings with the ministers were 
mainly consultative and on matters unconnected to the portfolio.This 
suggests that this minister had a large degree of autonomy and deci-
(r8);Jose Nosolini (15); Duarte Pacheco (rr); Nunes Mexia (8);Teot6nio Pereira (7); 
Mario de Figueiredo (7); Cardinal Manuel Cerejeira (6) and; Diniz da Fonseca (5).We 
can also add the names of Carneiro de Mesquita and Josue Trocado , whom Salazar 
met frequently to attend Sunday mass. 
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sion-making power (and that this was not a unique case). Technical 
competence was more highly valued than political charges: examples 
of this include those of Malheiro, Fezas Vital, Santos Costa, Teixeira de 
Sampaia, Rafael Duque and Duarte Pacheco. Political experience was 
also valued-and not necessarily at the head of any particular min-
istry: examples include Garcia Ramirez, Pais de Sousa and Teot6nio 
Pereira. As for the informal , level, those who were close to Salazar 
were not generally politicians, and the political duties they performed 
were more those of interlocutors, since Salazar favoured technical 
competence and political and personal trust. 
Although the conclusions are not particularly striking, they do 
contribute to enhancing the accuracy of what is known of Salazar's 
style of governing. While Pinto sustains the council of ministers gath-
ered 'only when there were major external or domestic policy issues 
t:hat required demonstrations of a united front for the nation' (Pinto 
2002: 433), this analysis of Salazar's personal notes shows the coun-
cil of ministers was called to pronounce on issues that required swift 
responses, and not necessarily on policy issues. Examples include the 
trade union opposition of 1934, the outbreak of the civil war in Spain 
in 1936, the bomb attacks of 1937 and the alleged conspiracies against 
the regime in 1938. 
However, it is important to note that these conclusions do not 
cover the entire duration of Salazarism. Franco Nogueira, who as well 
as being Salazar's biographer was minister of foreign affairs 1961-9, 
noted the existence of different phases during which cabinet meet-
ings were held with some regularity: in 1951 'his conviction that the 
work of the cabinet in plenary was of limited use took root' and 
'he returned to his habit of working with each minister individually' 
(Nogueira 197T 208, 212). 
What then can be said of the Portuguese case in the light of cur-
r:ent knowledge of the allocation of political power in 2oth-century 
dictatorships? Franco's Spain seems to be one European dictator-
, 
ship in which the council of ministers played the predominant deci-
1· on-making role. According to Jerez Mir, being a trusted minister of 
ranco meant empowerment and a high degree of autonomy (ex-
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cept in such portfolios as int ernal security and external affairs).'° Our 
research indicates th at in Portugal, while some ministers were also 
granted autonomy and deci sion-making power, th e overall situation 
was different in that the dictator was more involved in all areas of 
government . 
The lack of a pattern of decision-making allocation in th e fascist-
era dict ator ship s transforms th e generalisation of single cases into a 
bold task . Mor eover , different methodologic al approaches seem • to 
highlight the existence of competing interpretations between cen-
tralisation , empow erment and decision-making : namely , in the actual 
case of dictator ial regimes. Some authors have concluded that on 
some occasions, mini sterial recruitment may be a strategy to keep 
an individual under control instead of em powering them, or to give 
represent ation to informal 'political families'. Howev er, if the New 
State was more similar to Francoism than it was to Fascist Italy or 
Nazi Germany (Pinto 1996) in this dimension it does not hold en-
tir ely true. In fact, Salazar trusted some ministers, allowing them to 
be autonomous, but they were only few. The truth is that usually 
the majority was entirely dep endent on him for th e de cision-m aking 
process . 
'
0 See chapter 7. 
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